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**DYNAMIC STRATEGY RESEARCH FOUNDATION, INC.**

WARREN WELLS  
PRESIDENT

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February 7, 1968

SAVA 7/04/68

Mr. Richard Helms, Director  
Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

I am writing this letter to you in your capacity as a member of the National Security Council to give you an advance outline form presentation of proposals for the re-orientation of our present Vietnamese programs toward the achievement of the following objectives:

1. Either to greatly accelerate the evolution of an economically, politically, and militarily viable South Vietnamese state, or
2. Establish a basis for an early and honorable withdrawal of American forces, with a concurrent downtrend in military manpower requirements and military casualty rates in the South Vietnamese theater of operations.
3. Establish a sound moral basis for American presence in this area, with resultant favorable impact on the considerable segment of public opinion both at home and abroad which has been disaffected and antagonized by our conduct of the war to date. To a very considerable extent we could re-establish national unity and bring the weight of world public opinion to our side.

Implementation of the above objectives would be achieved by stimulating an accelerated escalation of the type of economic and social reforms which would establish widespread peasant support with simultaneous elimination of the present strong basis of popular support for the Viet Cong. The division of defensive efforts between countering guerilla activity on the one hand and invading North Vietnamese military units on the other could be progressively converted into a single-minded national resistance to armed invasion alone. Our support role could thus be progressively de-escalated to one of supplying the military materiel needed by a united South Vietnamese state.

Maximum priority would be accorded to the type of reforms which could provide optimum leverage with respect to the accomplishment of the aforementioned objectives. As an example, rapid pacification could be achieved in the strategic Delta area by relatively simple land and administrative reforms which could be effected overnight. Virtually every farm family in the area could be given a realistic economic stake in a non-Communist South Vietnam by dividing farm holdings on a basis which would limit holdings to a maximum of seven acres per family, corresponding to the dramatically effective reforms which

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have been accomplished in Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. (Against the background of the exceptional agricultural productivity in this area, a slightly smaller limit of, say, six acres might be established to further broaden the economic stake of the local population.)

1. The effectiveness of this reform with respect to insuring peasant loyalty could be greatly augmented by payment terms involving no more than 15% of the crop, with payments extending for a twenty year period. A crash implementation program with U. S. technical help could be instituted to accelerate acreage subdivision and distribution. Pending accomplishment of the program, the maximum land rental could be limited to 10% of the crop, with all other charges -- including federal, province and village taxes; hydrological service, etc. -- limited to an additional 10 to 15% with the latter limits to be effective for a period of five years beyond the cessation of hostilities.
2. As another example, the grinding burden of extortionist unofficial taxation on the peasantry could be largely eliminated by assigning suitably qualified American opposite numbers to each district and province chief throughout South Vietnam with full authority to insist on the elimination of any arbitrary rules and regulations which obstruct economic and social progress, and also with full authority to summarily suspend and prove charges against any district or province chief attempting to place an economic squeeze on the people under his jurisdiction. Further inhibition could be secured by regulations for the mandatory reduction to the permanent rank of private of any military officer, including present district and province chiefs, who might be found guilty of taking or extorting graft.

Rapid and timely implementation of a comprehensive program of the foregoing and other related reforms could be secured by establishing credibility of our determination to secure their implementation with the present South Vietnamese ruling structure, both civil and military. They would be advised to the effect that American support could only be continued to a nation which is establishing national unity on the basis of social and economic justice for all. They would be advised that all present financial aid would be withdrawn and that a province-by-province withdrawal of American armed forces would be instituted in the event of any failure to institute a comprehensive minimum reform program which would include a timetable of deadlines for reform implementation.

The ruling classes and the controlling military oligarchy who presently believe that they have us over a barrel with respect to a commitment of the national honor to the defense of South Vietnam would thus be faced with a choice of either rapidly instituting the reforms which have been promised over the past fifteen years or suffering the full loss

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
not only of salaried income and legitimate business profits, but also of the entirety of their real estate and business investments.

In the event that we had to demonstrate our credibility by actually instituting such a withdrawal, it could be halted any time that a new government came into power and initiated our minimum reform program. Any necessary contraction of our present military area involvement would have the effect of increasing our military density in the remaining South Vietnamese territory, with resultant increase of what might be termed our military area capability. Any necessary territorial withdrawals could also be accomplished in a manner which would re-establish our northernmost defense lines at points which provided very definite defensive advantages both with respect to terrain and in providing superior leverage for the utilization of our aerial superiority. It goes without saying that the South Vietnamese would be advised to the effect that we would never be re-committed to the reconquest of any territories which came under North Vietnamese control in the event that the South Vietnamese made it necessary for us to institute a province-by-province withdrawal.

A more detailed proposal along the above lines will be submitted as soon as it is completed. In the event of your interest you may wish to have the basic concepts involved submitted for review and elaboration by your very able technical staff personnel.

Yours sincerely,

DYNAMIC STRATEGY RESEARCH FOUNDATION



Warren Wells  
President

WW:mb

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